Русско-финская война

The chosen conceptual framework gives us an excellent opportunity for complex analysis of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. On the one hand, neorealist theory explains the rising tensions between the Soviet Union and Finland, Finland’s importance for long-term Soviet strategy, and the gradual escalation towards a military conflict. A neorealist interpretation of the Soviet position explains the need of Moscow to preserve its influence and security in the international system. Given the international situation, Stalin responded to the rising German militarism by securing any vulnerability along Russia’s borders. Finland’s strategic position made it exceedingly important in this regard. Finland posed a threat to Russia, because its territory provided clear access to the Soviet northwester ...

Introduction 2
Brief reference 3
Analytical framework 4
Case of the Winter War 7
Conclusion 12
Bibliography 13

Modern theories and concepts of international relations provide an elaborate inventory for empirical analysis and case-studies. This paper is an attempt to use that inventory to see if it helps us better understand certain historic events. Current state of international politics can be interpreted as a continuation of everlasting interstate tensions, confrontation and conflict. Thus, proper understanding of current politics requires proper analysis of previous events and processes, which in turn requires a theoretical basis.
The main question for this paper is Why the Soviet-Finnish war broke out? The war of 1939-1940, also known as the Winter War, remains to be a controversial point of international discussion to these days. Variety of opinions can be found not only along the west-east dichotomy in terms of academic traditions, but also within one country – Russia, which has its own historic borderline with the Soviet Union. The latter fact had a serious impact on academic research as it had specific ideological background. Analysis of certain historic events contributes to the whole body of theory and research disciplines. This concrete case of the Winter War can help us better understand why wars are still a crucial part of international life even in the twenty-first century.
For the purpose of the following discussion we will refer to two theoretical paradigms, neorealism and constructivism. The former explains state behavior as a reaction to external security environment and occurrence of threats, and the latter focuses on the internal characteristics including the security identity of the nation. According to the basic neorealist assumptions, the Soviet Union simply had no other choice than to invade Finland. Constructivism suggests to interpret the Finnish intransigence as a matter of cultural and security identity. Both theories provide different analytical frameworks, and it is to be seen which one does better.
First, we will set the analytical framework and then proceed to the empiric analysis. Lastly, conclusions will be made based on the previous analysis

On these conditions Russia is prepared:1. To guarantee Finland’s inviolability within the present Finnish boundaries, first and foremost the inviolability of its sea frontiers;2. In event of need, to assist Finland by force of arms on advantageous terms;3. To approve a trade treaty advantageous to Finland, which will benefit both agriculture and industry.Therefore, the pressing matter and the biggest concern of the Soviet Union was security of Leningrad. In general, Moscow offered a military treaty – a defensive alliance precisely. The problem was Finland’s Scandinavian outlook which would not allow Helsinki breach its policy of neutrality. As a result, the Finnish government took a negative stand on these proposals, which Prime Minister Cajander phrased as follows: “The proposal tends toviolate Finland’s sovereignty and is in conflict with the policy of neutrality which Finland follows in common with the nations of Scandinavia”. However, it was not a final refusal, as the talks continued in Moscow.The second phase of negotiation process opened on March 5, 1939. Each side showed firmness not willing to concede to another. For the Soviet Union, it was a matter of national security – basically, physical security of its borders. Finland took it as a matter of principal not to give up on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. As the Nazi Germany unleashed the war on September 1, 1939, Moscow intensified its efforts on the Finnish track. The Soviet Union was determined to establish a state of affairs around its borders which would help protect its neighbors and itself from falling victims to the war.Negotiations resumed in October 1939 in Moscow. The Soviet position summed up to denial of access of any enemy to the Gulf of Finland. It offered a compensation for cession of territories – a vast area in eastern Karelia, many times larger than the ceded one. The Finnish delegation rejected the proposal referring to the inviolability of Finnish territory. The talks lasted until November 13, when the Finnish representatives left Moscow. This outcome was seen in Helsinki as a diplomatic victory. Finnish military analysts did not believe that large amounts of Soviet troops could be deployed on the border, so the Finnish army would be able to resist the Red Army forces (presumably, 15-17 divisions) for six months. That time would be enough to find allies against the USSR or reach a compromise with Moscow. Despite incoming messages about Soviet troops deployment in the region, the Finnish government was sure the war would not happen, even on November 25. The Finns overestimated their own capabilities and hoped for Norwegian and Swedish help in vain.The pretext for war was an incident on the Soviet-Finnish border. On November 26 the Soviet information agency TASS reported that on 15.45 Finnish artillery fired the Soviet territory killing four and wounding nine soldiers. Historians are still debating the incident, the minority holding up to the official Soviet version of Finnish provocation. Some specialists suppose it was a Soviet provocation – intended or not. On November 26 Moscow sent a note to Helsinki claiming that “the concentration of the Finnish troops close to Leningrad is not only threatening the city but is a hostile act against the USSR which has already led to attack on the Soviet troops and casualties”. To avoid further provocations Moscow demanded withdrawal of Finnish troops for 20-25 kilometers away from the borderline. Finland denied responsibility for the incident and refused to withdraw its troops. On November 28, the Soviet note classified the Finnish position as hostile to the USSR and denounced the bilateral non-aggression pact of 1932. Two days later, the war began. The Soviet military command was planning a quick and short war against Finland, and to put a pro-Soviet government to rule the country. Communist Otto Kuusinen was chosen to become the head of the Finnish Democratic Republic, also known as the Terijoki Government. However, the war did not go as planned by Moscow. The Finnish resistance held up much longer with the troops repelling Soviet offensive for several months. The first phase of the Winter War lasted from November 30 to December 26, 1939. The Soviet army undertook several offensive attacks on the Karelian Isthmus but did not succeed. Offensive on the frontline along the Ladoga Lake was not successful as well. Thus, hostilities were taken over by a trench warfare which lasted roughly until January 31, 1940. The Soviet military command used it to reorganize and replenish the troops, also reforming its tactical approach. The renewed Soviet offensive started the final phase of the war on February 1. On 14th-17th the Red Army breached the Finnish defense line and started moving into the Finnish territory. Chief of Defence of the Finnish Defence Forces Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim realized the war was lost and reported to Helsinki accordingly. It made the government of Finland accept the peace conditions of the Soviet Union. While the Finnish delegations was negotiating in Moscow on March 8-12, the government in Helsinki once more requested the help of England and France. On 12th London and Paris decided to send troops by the end of March, but were taken back by the peace treaty signed in Moscow, which ceased all hostilities.The international reaction for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war was openly hostile towards the Soviet Union. Western media launched a huge anti-Soviet propaganda using the idea of the global communist revolution threat. On December 2, the United States imposed a “moral embargo” on supplies of aviation equipment and technology to the Soviet Union. On December 3, Finland addressed the League of Nations which decided to call for a meeting of its Council and invited the Soviet Union to take part. However, Moscow decided otherwise referring to the absence of war state between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic, which it deemed the only legal government of Finland. Meanwhile, the League Assembly established a committee for the Finnish question, which appealed to both warring parties for cessation of hostilities and for launch of peace talks. Moscow rejected the proposition and under American and French pressure, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations on December 14, 1939. Moscow did not approve of this decision, which was made with a voting procedure violation. Therefore, the Soviet Union declared itself “free from the moral responsibility for inglorious actions of the League of Nations”, deems itself “free to act as it pleases” and not bound by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League of Nations resolution of December 16 called for its member-states to provide assistance for Finland. It allowed the western allies to start preparations of military actions against the Soviet Union. However, Britain and France did doubt it was feasible because the Soviet-Finnish war was thought not to last long. Nevertheless, the Finnish resistance led to a trench war, and the plans of military assistance including troops deployment were back in London and Paris.