Russia's participation in international security institutions

References

1. Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation approved by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin on 12 February 2013.
2. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 2014
3. Bruce Blair, “Going Backwards: Number of US Nuclear Targets Has Grown Since 1993,” Manchester Guardian, June 16, 2000, .
4. Dr. S.J. Main, Russia’s Military Doctrine (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, April 2000), 2. See also: Charles J. Dick, Russia’s Draft Military Doctrine (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, November 1999).
5. Allison, Roy, Russia, the West and Military Intervention (Oxford University Press, 2013).

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Content

Introduction…………………………………………………………………..3
Chapter 1. Russia’s participation in international security…………………....6
1.1 Russia's new security and military policy after 2014……….……………6
1.2 Tools and levers of Russia's security policy …………………………...…8
Chapter 2. The relationships EU and Russia in international security institutions …………………………………………………………………………..15
2.1 Russia's diplomatic activism ……………………….…………………...15
2.2 Russia's vision of the European Union………………………………….18
Summary…………………………………………………………………….23
References…………………………………………………………………...25

Introduction

Principles and practices used by international organizations of military force in the conflict over the past two decades have changed beyond recognition. Indicated by prominent contradictions in the approaches of Russia and other countries, especially the US, to the objectives, nature and legitimacy of intervention in conflicts on foreign soil, including the conflicts in the territory of the newly independent states. Instead of a unified practice of UN peacekeeping mandates of the Security Council, in equally and jointly participated to the country's East and West, so far developed several further diverge from one another international intervention in conflict models.

The main goal of the 2008 reform was to improve the combat readiness of available troops and to enhance the ability to use them swiftly. This implied cutting the number of understaffed, ill-equipped formations to replace them with more agile and more potent units. Drastic cuts in the bloated officer corps were carried out (135,000 officer positions out of 355,000 were eliminated). In the army, the traditional division was suppressed and replaced by the brigade as the main formation. The ultimate goal is to bring these smaller brigades to full strength and to have them better equipped and more autonomous than the former divisions (the process of organizing three categories of brigades — heavy, medium, light — to get an ability to face contingencies of various formats started in late 2011).Only the airborne troops (vozdushno- desantnye voyska, VDV) retained divisions. Together with the Special Forces, the VDV stand at the core of the rapid reaction force that the Russian military is establishing. It should be noted, however, that in 2015, decisions were taken about the re-creation of a number of divisions, which appears as a 'response' to the measures taken by NATO to reassure central Eastern members but also to the deterioration of relations with Ukraine. The military leadership has also done much to streamline the command structure in order to enhance the general coherence and coordination, thus efficiency, of the various components of the armed forces. Command and control (C2) has noticeably improved. The number of military districts was cut from six to four in 2010; the four districts perform administrative and logistical functions, but become joint operational-strategic commands in cases of exercises and contingencies (in such circumstances, they command and control all forces — ground, air, Navy — under their supervision). As a response to Russia's concerns related to the perceived degradation of its security situation in the Arctic, a Joint Strategic Command 'North' was created, in late 2015, on the basis of the Northern Fleet.
As was stressed previously, the West is perceived as posing security challenges to Russia. However, the Western technological advance in the military field that the Russians had an opportunity to witness in Iraq or Kosovo wars has made the previous model of preparing for war with the West (a huge, conscription- based mass mobilization army) obsolete. Indeed, as stressed by General Gerasimov, 'frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past', while 'long-distance, contactless actions against the adversary' are becoming a major means of achieving one's goals. The materialization of the Chinese potential military challenge, although it is probably taken into account in defense planning, is considered to be preventable through the development of a dense web of relations with the PRC. The nuclear deterrent, the modernization of which has accelerated since the mid-2000s, combined with the multi-tier aerospace defense system that Russia is currently forming is seen as offering a solid hedge vis-à-vis these risks. Power projection beyond the borders of Russia and its immediate vicinity is now a goal (as demonstrated by the Syria operation, but also by Russian participation to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden) but for the time being only for limited operations, with clearly delineated goals. More ambitious plans might be considered for the longer term as they will depend on the economic situation, the evolution of the international security landscape, and Russia's ability to get access to military facilities of foreign countries. Ambitions are also constrained, in the current situation, by the rather difficult state of the Russian navy and shipbuilding, at least as concerns blue-water surface ships.
Despite the perception that threats and challenges are present in all strategic directions, the basic plan that has supported the military reform launched in 2008 is in fact aimed at making the armed forces more efficient for the contingencies that they are most likely to face. These are local conflicts, deleterious activities of militant or even transnational crime groups and possibly the management of large-scale social and political disorders — all this in the neighborhood of the country, which happens to be, as stressed earlier, a major priority in Russia's foreign policy. It was these contingencies that dictated the 'shock therapy the Kremlin imposed on the military right after the Georgia war. The structure of the Russian armed forces inherited from the Soviet Union was deemed unfit for efficiently waging wars of the kind of those that Russia fought in the post-Cold war context — in Chechnya, in Georgia —, or that it could have experimented (for example the Kyrgyz crisis in 2010 that involved ethnic clashes). Such situations require rapid mobilization of troops and the deployment of agile groups of forces that are at the core of the military restructuring going on in the Russian military. An extra motivation for following this path was the announcement in late 2010 that NATO intended to withdraw forces from Afghanistan: six years later, the Russians fear a spillover of growing Afghan instability in Central Asia and on their own territory, all these risks being aggravated, in the Russian perspective, by growing trouble in the Middle East.
Military reform has been backed by strong political will on the part of the political leadership, as illustrated by the steadily increasing military budgets. According to SIPRI databases, Russian military expenditure stood at 31.3 billion $ in 1995, 28.8 in 2000, 43 in 2005, 60.9 in 2010, 91 in 2015 (constant 2014). In recent years, the growing share of GDP devoted to defense has reflected the determination of the Russian government to maintain the effort to modernize the armed forces, in particular their re-equipment. This effort paid off, as one can conclude from the rather well organized and efficient operations in Crimea and Syria. While limited in size, these have shown that the Russian military has now decisively departed from the sorry state it was in when Vladimir Putin became the president of the Russian Federation in 2000.
In the context of the conflict in Ukraine, which the Kremlin presents as the product of a direct clash of interests between Moscow on the one hand, NATO, the European Union and the United States on the other hand, Russian jets have increasingly tested the defenses of NATO members, sometimes violating their airspace. Numerous, and, for many of them, large-scale military exercises and mobilization activities have fueled the image of the Russian military as a resurgent force. They create a lot of concern in neighboring countries, where it is feared that snap inspections (which started in 2013) could serve as a cover for preparations for military operations against them. But the trend showing a more active Russian military on the world stage appeared earlier. In 2007, Russia resumed regular strategic bomber flights, which had stopped after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian Navy has widened its presence on the world seas, especially in the Mediterranean, where Russia has resumed a permanent presence in 2013, albeit on a much smaller scale than in Soviet times.
Combat training, which was sacrificed in the Yeltsin era due to the financial crunch, has been a key focus in the Russian MoD's effort to rebuild national military capabilities. In the past few years, Russia has significantly increased the pace and size of its military exercises. Army, air, naval, nuclear and airborne forces have all been involved, separately or together, in manoeuvres held in all military districts (MD), sometimes with foreign countries. Exercises are now planned and executed at all levels — command post exercises (CPX) testing command structures (headquarters) and their communications networks without actual engagement of forces; field training exercises (FTX) under simulated combat conditions in open field; combined training exercises (CTE) with the armed forces of foreign countries; combined arms live fire exercises encompassing joint manoeuvres (army, navy, air force, etc.) held at the operational or tactical levels... The scenarios of drills have also become more complex. It is not rare that in parallel to annual strategic exercises, other drills are conducted 'in other parts of Russia or with a different focus', which makes the political and military leadership face more complex decision-making and tasks. The Russian leadership is all the more inclined to spend a lot of money on combat training that military exercises allow to impress neighbours and potential adversaries and to send strategic messages. Strategic mobility has been an important element in Russian exercises in recent years.
The military and Russia's international ambitions
Under Vladimir Putin, the military factor has clearly (and early) been brought to the fore as an important element in the effort aimed at reasserting Russia's prestige and authority on the world stage after more than a decade of dramatic diplomatic drawdown. In the previous years, the severe crisis of the armed forces had almost 'neutralized' the image of Russia as a military power. In the early twenty-first century, 'most states continue to see the maintenance of a powerful conventional military... as an instrument of policy, but also as an essential attribute of a strong state and a global actor', especially 'states aspiring to great power status'. As was stressed previously, Russia has never ceased to claim such a status since the sixteenth century, and has, under Putin, tried really hard to regain it. The period from the 1990s till the mid- 2000s that saw the Russian state downplay, primarily out of necessity, the role of military instruments in the advancement of its international interests is unquestionably over.
Vladimir Putin has always been unambiguous in expressing his belief that without a credible military force, a country is exposed to pressure by other states. In an article on defense that he published during the 2012 presidential campaign, he justified his determination to continue to build a stronger military in the following terms: 'in conditions of world economic and other tensions, there is always a temptation on the part of some to resolve their problems at others' expense, through pressure and coercion. It is no wonder that we already hear some voices saying that 'objectively' the question will soon be asked of whether resources of global significance should be declared as being above national sovereignty. We must exclude any such possibility, even a hypothetical one, with respect to Russia. This means that we should not tempt anybody with our weakness'. A number of domestic and international events have come to stimulate Vladimir Putin's eagerness to strengthen the country's military capabilities. First, he was obviously shocked by his realization, when the Kremlin decided to send the military again to Chechnya in 1999, that gathering rapidly a more or less potent force of 65,000 men was a very difficult, if not impossible, undertaking. Vladimir Putin is also convinced that things might have turned up differently (i.e. less negatively from the point of view of Russian interests) in Serbia (1999) or Iraq (2003) had Russia been able to show its military muscle to try and influence these situations. This should be taken into account in attempts at comprehending the motives behind Moscow's decision to use force in Ukraine or in Syria. It was spurred by Moscow's resolve to avoid further unfavorable political and geopolitical changes in places where it considers having strategic interests to defend. Vladimir Putin obviously judges that acting from a position of strength is also the right way to respond to the perceived Western challenges, and to 'contain' those of the West's initiatives that might be contrary to its interests. This is clearly a factor of the multiplication of provocative military moves close to the territory or the airspace of NATO members or of partners of the Alliance and of recurrent nuclear messaging.
Chapter 2. The relationships EU and Russia in international security institutions
2.1 Russia's diplomatic activism
Despite all the rust and incompetence that are still plaguing large parts of the Russian military, two factors should not be underestimated — one is Russia's feeling that it is facing a very hostile world, and that only credible military tools can protect it; the second is the Russian leaders' determination to use all means available to defend what they see as the country's strategic interests, a determination that is served by the facilitated decision-making on the use of force that the authoritarian nature of the regime allows for. However, despite the attention that Russian leaders — as well as their Western counterparts — have devoted to Moscow's military muscle flexing, the Kremlin has also pursued what two European scholars have defined as a 'hyperactive foreign policy. Russia's diplomatic activism is an indirect recognition of the limitations that still characterize Russia's ability to project power and to conduct ambitious military operations far from the national borders. It is meant to ensure that Russia's standing as one of the new 'centres of influence' is widely recognized, and to impose the idea of the West's declining influence in world affairs. It has been all the more energetic that Russian leaders consider there is a window of opportunity that should not be missed, created by the very uncertain transition period in Washington and the inward-looking attitude that the EU has displayed in recent years due to multiple crises {Greece, migrants, Brexit...).
Russia has clearly made it a priority goal to demonstrate that it is not merely a regional power {President Obama stated in 2014 that 'Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness). Syria has been a key laboratory on this front. On Syria, indeed, Russia has combined military action with intense diplomatic action. Russia has modified the political landscape around the conflict not only by using its military, although admittedly this has been an essential factor, but also by showing an ability to talk to all involved players. Although Moscow has not attained its initial goal of obtaining an international coalition that would have seen it siding with Western states {and major regional powers) 'on an equal basis', it has made it unavoidable for Washington to discuss Syria with Moscow.
Russia has also promoted an agenda of denunciation of the West's, especially the United States', role in undermining the rules of the international game, thus trying to affect its credibility. For example, the Security strategy denounces the weakening of the system of global security and system of treaties and agreements in the arms control sphere. This is a reference, among other things, to Russia's constant {since the late 1990s) criticism of Western military operations that were conducted without a mandate of the UN Security Council {Kosovo, Iraq), of Washington's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty, etc. The West has replied by pointing to Russia's own ambiguities in fulfilling its legally-binding international commitments {direct involvement in separatist conflicts in the former Soviet Union, apparent non­compliance with the INF treaty, of the principle of inviolability of borders in Ukraine...).
On a more strategic level, another element in Moscow's strategy has been to highlight its ability to develop strong relations with all leading powers of the emerging 'multipolar international system' {Foreign policy concept). Russia has worked hard to demonstrate that it enjoys the support of other powers that are concerned about the West's presumed inclination to interfere in other countries' internal affairs and lack technologies of influence on state structures and population through reliance on information networks'.
a) 'Tsennost' nauki v predvidenii'.
b) Introduction of Russian Futures 2025, by Hiski Haukkala and Nicu Popescu, p. 7.
c) 'Barack Obama: Russia Is a Regional Power...', see footnote 10.
of willingness to share international power with rising powers. This strategy has been pursued consistently since the late 1990s, starting with the 'strategic partnership' with China (which has gradually become a platform for the two countries to promote the establishment of a 'multipolar' world order, the essence of which is to counterbalance perceived Western hegemony) and the Russia-India-China (RIC) strategic triangle, which was initiated in 1998 by Moscow, gathers once a year at the foreign minister level and is supposed to be another incarnation of the multipolar order. In this perspective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS grouping have been of particular value to the Kremlin. Their meetings have been opportunities to declare their members' resentment towards Western policies — unilateral sanctions, lack of willingness to share influence in international organizations (IMF, World Bank, etc.), consequences of the 'hegemony of the dollar'... Russia, which has also promoted the importance of G20 as a more legitimate and appropriate forum than G7, has worked to convince the rest of the world of the rising influence of these organizations/groupings, especially in a context where it needs to counter the West's argument that the Ukraine conflict has isolated Russia. From this point of view, the SCO's decision to integrate India and Pakistan as new members and the BRICS' progress in building up its own system of financial institutions are evolutions that are worth advertising. In these groupings, Russia has promoted the discussion of some of the concerns mentioned in its Security strategy, for example those related to the 'attempts by some states to use economic methods, instruments of financial, trade, investment and technological policy to solve their geopolitical problems' (this points to sanctions but also to what Russia — and others — sees as 'exclusive' trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). As stressed in the Security strategy, the best option to meet such challenges resides in regional or sub-regional agreements (one understands that it is all about the Eurasian Economic Union, the SCO, the BRICS...) as well as in using regional currencies -- all being presented as hedges against crisis phenomena.
However, Russia's diplomatic activity is not only a function of the crisis in Russia-West relations. It reflects realism on Moscow's part about the vulnerability of its international position. The weaknesses of its power (economic, soft, even military) mean that being a 'centre of influence' is possible only through association (with former Soviet states in the first place as was stressed before, but also via participation in international organizations and fora and partnership with other leading powers). Russia's moving to a more active Asian agenda since the early 2000s (and so far with only limited progress) is of course a consequence of its degraded relations with Western powers. However it also means that Moscow recognizes the weakness of its positions in Asia. This is in large part due to the historically rooted Western-centrism of its international policy. The Kremlin feels this should be corrected given the rising strategic and economic importance of Asia, in particular the Asia-Pacific.