Основные характеристики современных миграционных процессов в Европе

Курсовая работа по специальности международные отношения, выполнена на английском языке. Тема - The main features of contemporary immigration in Europe ...

TABLE OF CONTENTS.


Introduction………………………………………………………………………...3
Chapter 1. Migration processes in the modern world 6
1.1. The definition of migration………………………………………………….6
1.2. Migration flows in the European Union……………………….…………...11
1.3. Migration policy of the European Union…………………………………..18
Chapter 2. Migration processes in France. 23
2.1. The history of immigration in France ………………………………….......23
2.2. Immigration flows to France and current immigration policy 25
Conclusion..…………………………………………………………………….....29
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………30

A fundamental characteristic of people is their movement from place to place. Poverty, injustice and armed conflicts displace millions of people across the globe. In the past 30 years, the number of international migrants has more than doubled, to an estimated 191 million worldwide. These include economic migrants compelled to move to provide for their families, refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing persecution, and victims of human trafficking...

...Immigration seems to be making more headlines in recent years. As the world globalizes in terms of nations’ economies, trade and investment, borders are opened up more easily for “freer” flow of goods and products. People are supposedly freer to move around the world, too.
So, immigration is emerging as a key issue across the wor ld and across the Europe especially, and it is the subject of much current debate.
The goal of my research is to study the migration processes in Europe, and also in France. And according to the goal I can set the following tasks:
- To study the definition of the migration
- To look at the migration flows in the European Union and at its migration policy
- And finally, to examine the history of immigration in France, immigration flows and current immigration policy of this country.
The object of my research is migration processes in Europe and in France in particular, and the subject is the socio-economic and political issues connected with the migration processes in Europe.

Millions emigrated from Europe, first to the colonies and later to the Americas and the Antipodes. Europe also has a long history of forced migration: from the expulsion of the Jews from Spain to the population shifts in southeast Europe caused by the many wars between the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.Large-scale immigration into Western Europe is more recent. From 1960 to 1973, the number of foreign workers in Western Europe doubled from 3 to 6% of the workforce. It was highest in places like the UK and France, with relatively open access for citizens of their former colonies; in Germany, too, the number of foreigners (nearly half Turks) rose 4million in the 25 years after 1960, although they seldom became citizens. But primary immigration into Europe – driven by labourneeds – all but ended with the oil crisis of 1973. The foreign-born population has continued to grow, not least because most countries still issue tens of thousands of residence permits each year for the purposes of family reunification (nearly 80% of the 58,700 people accepted for permanent settlement in the UK in 1997 were wives and children). EU countries also issue thousands of work permits each year. In Britain in 1997, nearly half of the 54,000 permits went to Americans and Japanese mainly in highly skilled jobs; elsewhere in Europe the permits often go to seasonal farm workers. But the proportion of foreign-born residents in the EU remains low, ranging from 9% in Austria, Belgium and Germany, to under 2% in Spain.Since the late 1980s, the number of people applying for asylum has increased sharply. In 1984 there were only 104,000 applications in Western Europe. This figure grew to 692,000 in 1992 and then declined during much of the 1990s. Numbers grew again to 350,000 in 1998 and about 400,000 in 1999, although this year they have begun to fall away. Thus asylum has become one of the principal means of immigration into the EU.Why this sudden surge? The end of the Cold War lifted the lid on a number of small wars and ethnic conflicts around the world. In this type of warfare, the combatants – regular troops complimented by paramilitaries – often target civilian populations. Many people applying for asylum are ostensibly fleeing such “ethnic cleansing”, most notably in Bosnia in the early 1990s and Kosovo in the late 1990s. Also, with the end of communist rule many eastern Europeans believe that their aspirations for a better life can only be served in the west. With freer movement and cheaper travel, it is not surprising that many have tried to emigrate westward. The problem is that tens of thousands have tried to use the asylum process to do so, leading to a backlash, in some countries, against all types of migrants.But in some EU states, asylum has become a totemic issue. It overlaps with other emotional matters such as ethnicity and identity, revealing an illiberal streak in liberal democracies. But we should keep things in perspective. It may have been easier for migrants to enter the UK 100 years ago, but once there they were far more likely to face violence and had nothing like the legal and social protection of today’s welfare states. None the less, resentment of “the other” can be exploited by demagogues, especially when there is no obvious gap in the job market for refugees to fill. Overall, refugees are only a small burden on taxpayers – but this may not be how it seems in areas of high refugee density, where migrants share services such as schools, hospitals and housing with the poorest locals.Most people think about the asylum issue in domestic terms, but it is pan-European. Across the continent, the policy issues and the debate are remarkably similar. Some countries have experienced much larger increases than others. Germany has consistently received more refugees than other EU countries. There are, of course, nuances in the tone of the debate and the policy framework in different states. But the stress everywhere has been on reducing the flow, while trying to distinguish genuine asylum-seekers from purely “economic” migrants. It is obviously beyond the immediate power of the EU to eradicate the root causes of all migration. But over time, if the EU wants to reduce migratory pressure, it will have to provide more development aid, debt relief, and fair trade, and it will need to be better equipped to prevent conflict and keep the peace in trouble spots around the world. These objectives lie at the heart of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. All European states are now net immigration countries. For more established host countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, this has been the case since at least the 1960s. Despite a decline in migration after recruitment stops in 1973-1974, immigration flows have been continuous, for the most part taking the form of family reunion, refugee flows and labour migration. Most have experienced particularly high levels of immigration since the 1990s.Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and Nordic countries are all examples of this trend. A notable exception is Germany, which has seen a decrease in flows since the early 1990s, although this can be attributed to the exceptionally high levels of influx in the early 1990s.A second category of European countries became net receiving countries in the 1980s, in large part because of growing economic prosperity (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Finland), as well as a redirection of migration flows following the introduction of more restrictive policies in north European receiving countries. These ‘old new’ immigration countries have also experienced increased migration since the 1990s, with recent inflows of labour migrants to Ireland, Italy and Portugal being particularly pronounced. After 1989, former socialist countries on the EU’s eastern borders became important transit countries for migrants attempting to enter more prosperous west European host countries. This pattern has persisted in the case of EU candidate countries and associated states in Southeast Europe. But for most of the countries that recently joined the EU, economic growth and political stability have rendered them countries of destination in their own right. Cyprus, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia all now have positive net migration.Just as significant as quantitative changes, though, are shifts in the composition of these flows. While absolute numbers of family-related and protection-seeking migration have remained roughly the same since 1999, the number of labour immigrants and their share of total flows has increased substantially. The national composition of recent flows varies for each European host country. Significant flows since 1990 include Turkish and Moroccan nationals in EU-15 countries, as well as protection seekers from former Yugoslav countries, Iraq and Iran. In 2001, the following source countries featured significantly in flows to European states: Moroccans in Belgium; Iraqis and Afghanis in Denmark; Russians in Finland; Moroccans and Algerians in France; Poles and Turks in Germany; Romanians and Ukrainians in Hungary; Albanians, Romanians and Moroccans in Italy; Angolans and Cape Verde nationals in Portugal; Iraqis in Sweden; and Indians in the UK.Meanwhile, a number of commentators have observed new patterns of mobility. One important shift is the observed increase in short-term, circular migration, often as a household strategy for supplementing the income of families at home. A second is the increase in irregular migration, which can take the form of illegal entry or overstay, often organised by smugglers or people traffickers. There have been some attempts to estimate the scale of the phenomenon. The EU, for example, suggested a figure of 500,000 irregular migrants entering EU states annually. Estimates of stocks of irregular migrants in European countries put the number in Italy at 800,000, Germany 500,000, France 300,000, and the UK 200,000 – although such figures are should clearly be treated with caution.One important factor is policy changes in European host countries. While possibilities for legal migration programs generally remain limited, a number of European countries have opened up possibilities for selected (especially high-skilled) labour migrants. This has clearly contributed to the rise in labour migration. The expansion of possibilities for labour migration reflects problems of labour shortages and mismatch of supply and demand in many European countries. However, as noted, programmes remain limited in scope. They certainly cannot absorb all would-be labour migrants, nor are they sufficiently broad to fully meet domestic demand for foreign labour. A second set of factors influencing migration flows over the past 15 years has been the changed relationship between the EU and its neighbours to the East and South. For a start, the removal of restrictions on travel for nationals of communist countries opened up multiple channels for regular mobility: intra-company transfers, possibilities for study, temporary labour migration programmes. Tighter control of the EU’s new external borders to the East are also limiting possibilities for mobility between new member states and their non-EU neighbours. Other types of flows are likely to continue or increase, given the labour market and legislative trends mentioned above, and especially once temporary restrictions on the free movement of nationals from the new EU member states are lifted.Of course, a complete explanation of the scale and composition of recent migration flows should also take into account factors such as changing economic and political conditions in countries or origin; cultural, historical and economic ties between countries of origin and destination; the role of migrant networks in facilitating mobility; and the opportunities for travel and labour offered by smugglers and people traffickers. All in all, international migration plays an increasing role in most Member States. Immigration brings both economic and social opportunities and challenges to countries receiving immigrants. At the same time, immigration is now at the forefront of European and national policy agendas.1.3 Migration policy of the European Union.There are series of policy dilemmas in the EU. They can be divided into four categories: dilemmas of, respectively, labour migration policy; migration control policy; asylum and protection systems; and integration policies.Labour migration. In many countries there is a serious conflict between the economic and demographic case for expanded labour migration, and public resistance to increased migration. European states have dealt with this problem in different ways. In most cases, governments have been able to introduce liberalising legislation or programs. Most of these have been for high-skilled and skilled migrants, in the form of points systems, streamlined procedures for recruitment in particular sectors or occupations, or facilitating labour market access for foreign graduates.These programs have usually been introduced in addition to the sorts of provisions for skilled migration that already exist in most European countries: individual work permits based on a labour market test, or intra-company transfers.However, explicit attempts at expanding programs have been politically controversial. One way of ‘selling’ them has been to accompany liberalisation with promises of stricter control of other, non-economically beneficial migrants or refugees. Alternatively, or in addition, governments have seen fit to introduce some guarantee that these programs are temporary and will not lead to permanent settlement (for example in the case of the German Green Card). In other cases, governments have avoided political conflict by introducing liberalisation by stealth, through acts and decrees that do not require parliamentary scrutiny and receive little media attention. Another tactic has been to tolerate substantial illegal migration, or to meet demand through periodic regularisation programs (for example in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain).None of these compromises are particularly commendable, and certainly do not constitute ustainable solutions to problems of labour shortages. Moreover, even in countries where an increase in labour migration has been politically feasible thus far, such reforms will almost certainly become more controversial as economic and demographic changes necessitate further opening up of labour markets, including to larger numbers of low-skilled immigrants.Migration control. Migration control policies also raise difficult dilemmas for European governments. There are serious limits to governments’ attempts to control irregular movement, residence and labour.Watertight internal controls to prevent irregular stay would require a degree of state monitoring and intervention that is not acceptable in liberal democratic countries, especially those with a tradition of limited state regulation of citizens. Similarly, stringent border controls are expensive and cause serious delays to border crossings, and can negatively affect tourism and trade. Moreover, as smuggling and trafficking networks become more sophisticated in their methods, these controls also need to be more high-tech in order to keep pace. In the case of the Schengen countries, this form of control of internal borders is in any case ruled out by the abolition of internal border checks.Border and internal controls are also constrained by states’ duties of non-refoulement. Where irregular entrants or residents apply for asylum, a range of rights kick in, making it difficult for states to deport these claimants or exclude them from their territory. While states have attempted to bypass these commitments through readmission agreements, accelerated asylum procedures, or reception in the region, the possibilities for restriction are constrained.Attempts to control irregular labour face a rather different set of constraints: a conflict with business interests in securing a supply of cheap labour. This interest to a large extent explains the very low enforcement rate of employer sanctions in many countries. But there are also ethical constraints to cracking down on illegal employment and stay. Once people have been resident over a prolonged period, it is difficult to expel them for humanitarian and practical reasons, and there may be a strong case for regularising their status. These considerations, combined with the interests of employers in retaining cheap and efficient workers, have often militated in favour of regularisation programs, or ‘adjustment’ of status on a case basis.Asylum systems. Since the early 1980s, European states have pretty much exhausted the repertoire of feasible restrictions to asylum systems – short of outright abandonment of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Welfare and accommodation support for asylum seekers has been radically reduced, and in some cases withheld altogether; asylum seekers have been dispersed to specified regions, confined to reception centres, or detained; their applications have been assessed through special accelerated procedures; and visa restrictions and rules on “safe countries” of origin or transit have limited access to asylum systems. Despite all of these changes, asylum systems continue to fail to meet their two major aims: supporting those in need of protection, and screening out or deterring those who do not. Thus they continue to be the object of criticism both from human rights and refugee groups concerned about gaps in protection; and from sections of the public and media who believe they are a ‘soft touch’ for immigrants abusing generous asylum and welfare provisions.Integration. This is one of the areas in which European approaches have tended to show the greatest degree of divergence. National approaches have much to do with fairly entrenched patterns of thought on national identity, citizenship and the role of the state. In this sense, the dilemmas of integration policy in Europe are not so much rooted in the classic tension between populist closure, economic considerations, and liberal norms and institutions (although such tensions may surface). Rather, they can be traced to often competing values and beliefs about what it means to be a participating member of society, and how best to encourage people to achieve this type of participation.At risk of over-simplification, we can distinguish between three main approaches to integration that were crystallised in European treatment of immigrants after the Second World War: - the multicultural approach, implying tolerance of cultural and religious diversity, robust anti-discrimination legislation, and easy access to citizenship;- the social citizenship approach, offering immigrants a type of quasi-membership in the form of full social and economic rights, but restricted access to full citizenship;- the republican approach, which allows easy access to citizenship, but on the understanding that citizens divest themselves of particular ethnic or religious traits in the public sphere.However, all three models have come under criticism over the past decade for failing to deal adequately with the challenges of integration. One of the reasons for this critique is linked to disappointment about the apparent ‘failed’ integration of many second or third generation immigrants. A second reason for doubts about existing approaches to integration is the particular problem associated with the integration of Muslim residents in European states. Since the early 1990s, and especially since 11 September 2001, Islamic beliefs and practices have been singled out as incompatible with liberal democratic and human rights standards in European countries. This has resulted in the often populist targeting of Muslim communities in Europe. It has surfaced in recent debates and measures banning teachers or pupils from wearing the headscarf in schools in Germany and France; or concerns about Muslim extremism following the Islamic fundamentalist motivated murder of a film director in the Netherlands.On a more positive note, there has also been a marked trend towards more generous rules on naturalisation in Europe. We can expect that this will in turn create more robust ethnic minority groups, with better prospects for political mobilisation. In this sense, the continued presence of ethnic minorities in itself acts as an important check on restrictive immigration policies. It does not necessarily exert pressure in favour of more liberal entry policies, but it certainly creates pressure to liberalise policies on cultural diversity and discrimination.In sum, immigration exposes some of the basic tensions and limitations of European liberal welfare systems. Firstly, it raises difficult questions concerning whom to include: should membership be restricted to current members (the logic of democracy), or extended to certain non-citizens (based on economic considerations, or rights principles)? Second, where exclusion is the chosen strategy, as in the case of illegal immigrants or rejected asylum seekers, how can this be enforced without jeopardizing civil liberties, human rights and economic interests? And third, where inclusion is the approach, how should states strike a balance between allowing space for diversity, whilst motivating participation in existing structures?Large-scale immigration to the European Union has highlighted big differences in the way the 27 member states handle newcomers from non-EU countries.