Антидемпинговые меры Евросоюза относительно товаров,ввозимых из России.

Anti-dumping Measures of European Union
Against Goods Imported from Russia

Contents
Dumping. Problem Overview
Situation in European Union
Situation with Russian Carbamide as an Example of Anti-Dumping Measures of the EU against Imported Goods
List of books and articles

Антидемпинговые меры Евросоюза относительно товаров,ввозимых из России.

5. Strategic dumping gets benefits from an overall strategy which includes both low export pricing and maintaining a closed home market in order to reap monopoly or oligopoly profits.
The GATT 1994 sets forth a number of basic principles applicable in trade between Members of the WTO, including the “most favoured nation” principle. It also requires that imported products not be subject to internal taxes or other changes in excess of those imposed on domestic goods, and that imported goods in other respects be accorded treatment no less favourable than domestic goods under domestic laws and regulations, and establishes rules regarding quantitative restrictions, fees and formalities related to importation, and customs valuation. Members of the WTO also agreed to the establishment of schedules of bound tariff rates. Article VI of GATT 1994, on the other hand, explicitly authorizes the imposition of a specific anti-dumping duty on imports from a particular source, in excess of bound rates, in cases where dumping causes or threatens injury to a domestic industry, or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, commonly known as the Anti-Dumping Agreement, provides further elaboration on the basic principles set forth in Article VI itself, to govern the investigation, determination, and application, of anti-dumping duties. Nevertheless the GATT and later WTO agreement do not pass judgments. The main focus of these trade-and-payment agreements is on how governments can or cannot react to dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement explicates and expands Article VI, and they interact with each other. When both these agreements operate together, they allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners.
Situation in European Union
European Union anti-dumping is under the purview of the European Council. However, implementation of anti-dumping actions (trade defence actions) is taken after voting by various committees with member state representation. The bureaucratic entity responsible for advising member states on anti-dumping actions is the Directorate General Trade (DG Trade), based in Brussels. Community industry can apply to have an anti-dumping investigation begin. DG Trade first investigates the standing of the complainants. If they are found to represent at least 25% of community industry, the investigation will probably begin. The process is guided by quite specific guidance in the regulations. The DG Trade will make a recommendation to a committee known as the Anti-Dumping Advisory Committee, on which each member state has one vote. Member states abstaining will be treated as if they voted in favour of industrial protection, a voting system which has come under considerable criticism.
As is implied by the criterion for beginning an investigation, EU anti-dumping actions are primarily considered part of a "trade defence" portfolio. Consumer interests and non-industry related interests (“community interests”) are not emphasized during an investigation. An investigation typically looks for damage caused by dumping to community producers, and the level of tariff set is based on the damage done to community producers by dumping. If consensus is not found, the decision goes to the European Council. If imposed, duties last for five years theoretically. In practice they last at least a year longer, because expiry reviews are usually initiated at the end of the five years, and during the review process the status-quo is maintained.
True globalization and “world-wide trade” is a worthwhile goal and one that is achievable despite the differences between countries that have caused problems in WTO negotiations. However, it is a simple fact that differences exist; not all countries are equal or homogenous and these differences can be seen in manufacturing, supply and trading systems and costs. It is also true that within the EU these costs are higher than many countries outside the EU.
In many non-EU countries low labour costs legitimately lower production costs. Whilst this raises concerns of poor social standards, these are countered by initiatives such as the FTA’s Business Social Compliance Initiative1 which ensures, via independent auditing, that companies comply with minimum social standards. As a result of these lower costs, European manufacturers have to adapt their own methods to become more innovative and competitive if the EU is to become a true part of the worldwide trade agenda.
Many companies within the manufacturing sector – in particular those from northern Europe – have adapted well over the last years; by shifting production outside the EU to take advantage of the lower production costs in addition to being part of the local marketplace. Unfortunately, other companies have not been so diligent.
When asking the question “is it within the ‘Community Interest’ to impose anti-dumping duties?”, the Commission must – aside from considering the Complainant – also pay attention to European retailers, importers and perhaps more particularly European consumers; it cannot be in their interest to have increased costs as a result of duties.
It seems that, rather than anti-dumping measures being utilized to combat offensive pricing tactics by companies exporting consumer products to the EU, they are instead being used to protect European manufacturers from competitive, non-European companies. This can be shown by the increase in anti-dumping cases against products whose import levels have increased – often as a result of the expiration of quotas, which were imposed in order to protect European manufacturers and allow them time to adapt to increasing competitiveness from overseas. It is certainly arguable that quotas are a form of protectionism, but it is equally arguable that anti-dumping measures are as well. There is also the question of hypocrisy. The EU provides third countries with aid programs – some of which assist in the development of manufacturing industries. Is it an acceptable practice to subsequently punish those countries by imposing TDI measures when their industries use their competitive advantage over EU companies and export low cost consumer products to the EU?
The Commission is not wholly to blame for EU companies using the anti-dumping route as a defence against cheap imports. However, it is responsible for the ease at which that route can be taken. A far more rigorous process in selecting which complaints are worthy of investigation is required. Although the FTA accepts that anti-dumping legislation may be required under the correct conditions, it is legitimate to ask whether an anti-dumping system is at all viable in today’s global marketplace. Whilst this is perhaps going a step too far, there are certain aspects of the current EU Anti-Dumping Regulation, both legislative and applicative, that need to be addressed.
Situation with Russian Carbamide as an Example of Anti-Dumping Measures of the EU against Imported Goods
For the first time anti-dumping measures against imported carbamide were imposed in November, 1987 as an initiative of European manufacturers of nitric fertilizers. After that, European companies made several attempts to reconsider and toughen the existing standards. It was until March, 1995, when the decision of European Council entered into force; it obliged foreign manufacturers to pay special anti-damping tariff which was equal to the difference between115 ecu per tonne of fertilizer and the customs tariff of carbamide.
As a result, in 1999 – 2000 Russian state delivery of carbamide into the EU was almost suspended. In 2001 Russian manufacturers tried to annul a decree within usual five-year review, but they didn’t succeed in their attempts.
In August, 2005 European manufacturers sent to the EU Commission a request not only to leave the existing measure in force but also to turn it to ad valorem tax (26% of the customs tariff). Against the background of the decrease of the profitability and the increase of the natural gas prices, this situation caused the consolidation of Russian manufacturers of carbamide, because total suspension of exporting raw materials would cause 350–400 million USD losses per year. Ministry of Economical Development of Russian Federation fully supported the initiative of Russian companies.
Anti-dumping investigation began officially in May, 2006. During that year Russian manufacturers (PLC “EuroChem”, PLC “Acron”, PLC“Minudobreniya”) cooperated with anti-dumping department of EU Council. They submitted the commission with materials in which presented economical, financial and account information on the current situation. These materials were to prove that European companies will not incur losses in case of decree abolition. Besides that, Russian party enlisted the support of European agricultural associations – the main customers of carbamide. Representatives of the EU Council spent several months in Russia visiting manufacturing firms of the three companies checking carefully the correspondence of the submitted data with the current situation.
Eventually, 20 out of 27 countries of EU voted for the revocation of the imposed tariff. On August 1, 2007 the decision of the EU Council became officially effective. According to it, the anti-dumping measures against imported Russian carbamide were abolished.
The most important thing about this revocation is that now there is a chance that the EU will refuse its protectionist policy towards foreign goods. Before that the EU despite the declaration of the principals of open and free trade has always used the effective anti-dumping measures against “unprofitable” goods.