Международный бизнес

С О Д Е Р Ж А Н И Е

Введение……………………………………………………………………………………..3
1.Аналитическая часть ………………………………………………………………....5
1.1. Краткая история оптового бизнеса в России...........................................……………5
1.2.Современное состояние и основные направления развития оптового бизнеса…6
1.3. Потенциал розничных сетей ………………………………………………………… 11
1.4. Общая характеристика предприятия ООО «ТК Союзконтракт-Тверь»…..……14
2. Проектная часть………………………………………………………………………..19
2.1.Краткое описание и цели проекта …………………........................................………19
2.2 Участники проекта…………………………………………………………………… .19
2.3 Рыночные перспективы реализации проекта……………………………………..20
2.3.1 Тенденции в отрасли………………………………………………………………...20
2.3.2 Формат магазина……………………………………………………………………..23
2.3.3 Спрос на продукцию………………………………………………………………...28
2.3.4 Конкуренты…………………………………………………………………………..29
2.3.5 Описание продукта и его конкурентные преимущества…………………31 2.4Стратегия выхода на рынок…………………………………………………………….35
3. Финансово - экономическое обоснование проекта…..…………………….38
3.1Бюджет проекта…………………………………………………………………………..38
3.1.1Прогноз выручки от продаж………………………………………………………..38
3.1.2.Расчет переменных расходов……………………………………………………...38
3.1.3.Условно постоянные расходы…………………………………………………….39
3.1.4. Расчет потребности в рабочем капитале………………………………………...40
3.1.5.Инвестиционные затраты………………………………………………………….41
3.1.6.Амортизационные отчисления…………………………………………………….42
3.1.7. Налоги………………………………………………………………………………42
3.1.8.Операционные расходы……………………………………………………………42
3.1.9.Отчет о прибылях и убытках………………………………………………………42
3.1.10.Денежный поток от активов……………………………………………………...42
3.2.Оценка требуемого уровня доходности……………………………………………….43
3.3.Оценка рисков и меры по страхованию………………………………………………47
3.4.Анализ чувствительности………………………………………………

Международный бизнес

Although the "new issues" are not identical, as for example, negotiations on telecommunications or financial services differ from intellectual property rights, but they do have one common or generic characteristic. Specifically, they involve not the border barriers of the original GATT, but domestic regulatory and legal systems embedded in the institutional infrastructure of the economy, as well as the flows of factors-investment and labour. The degree of intrusiveness bears little resemblance to the shallow integration of the GATT with its focus on border barriers and its buffers to safeguard domestic policy space.
The inclusion of the new issues in the Uruguay Round was an American initiative, and this policy agenda was largely driven by American MNE's (multinational enterprises) who were market leaders in the services and high tech sectors. These corporations made it clear to the government, that without a fundamental rebalancing of the GATT, they would not continue to support a multilateral policy, but would prefer a bilateral or regional track. But they didn't just talk the talk, they also walked the walk, organizing business coalitions in support of services and intellectual property in Europe and Japan, as well as some smaller OECD countries. The activism paid off, and it's fair to say that American MNE's played a key, perhaps even the key role in establishing the new global trading system. I'll return to this shortly.
By the onset of the 1990's, a major change in economic policy was underway. The debt crisis of the 1980's, and thus the role of the IMF and the World Bank, plus the fall of the Berlin Wall—a confluence of two unrelated events— ushered in a major transformation of the economic policy paradigm. Economic reforms—deregulation, privatization, liberalization—were seen as essential elements for launching and sustaining growth. Economic regulatory reform is at the heart of the concept of trade in services. Even without the thrust from the Uruguay Round, many developing countries began to see reform of key service sectors such as telecommunications as essential building blocks in the soft infrastructure underpinning growth. They also saw the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) as a means to furthering domestic reform.
Thus, well before the end of the Round, the hardline coalition had disappeared and coalitions of developing countries concentrated on liberalization of agriculture and textiles and clothing. Many undertook unilateral liberalization of tariffs and other trade barriers and by the conclusion in December 1993. They were among the strongest supporters of the negotiations that they so adamantly opposed in the 1980's. What might be called a North-South Grand Bargain was completed and was quite different from old-time GATT reciprocity: I'll open my market if you'll open yours. It was essentially an implicit deal: the opening of OECD markets to agriculture and labor-intensive manufactured goods, especially textiles and clothing, for the inclusion into the trading system of trade in services, intellectual property and (albeit to a lesser extent than originally demanded) investment.
Also, as virtually a last minute piece of the deal, it included the creation of a new institution, the WTO, with the strongest dispute settlement mechanism in the history of international law. Since the WTO consisted of a "single undertaking" (in WTO legalese) the deal was pretty much take it or leave it for the Southern countries. So they took it but, it's safe to say, without a full comprehension of the profoundly transformative implication of this new trading system (an incomprehension shared by their Northern negotiators as well I might add).
The Northern piece of the bargain consisted of some limited progress in agriculture, with a commitment to go further in new negotiations in 2000; limited progress in textiles and clothing with most of the restrictions to be eliminated later rather than sooner; a rather significant reduction in tariffs in goods in exchange for deeper cuts by developing countries. On the whole, not great but not bad when compared with previous rounds centred on traditional GATT-type market access negotiations. But this was not a GATT negotiation as the Southern piece of the deal so amply demonstrates.
The essence of the South side of the deal, the inclusion of the new issues and the creation of the new institution, requires major upgrading and change in the institutional infrastructure of many or most Southern countries: governance. These changes will take time and cost lots of money. The transition periods for implementation for developing countries were arbitrary and not based on any analysis or, indeed on any awareness of this systemic problem. The technical assistance promised by the North was not followed up. And the new increasingly litigious and evidentiary-intensive dispute settlement system required a level of legal expertise rare in non-OECD countries, or it required pots of dollars to purchase Northern legal services.
There were three significant unintended consequences to this Grand Bargain (or Bum Deal). One is a wide and serious North-South divide in the WTO. While the South is hardly homogeneous, there is a broad consensus that the Uruguay Round should be "rebalanced" before any new negotiations are launched. The Seattle meeting in 1999 ended with the walkout of virtually all the developing countries. What is more striking is the proactive role of the Southern countries both before and after Seattle. They are far better organized and informed, in part because of the rise of democracy and the growing awareness of trade policy issues in the general public and politi-
cal institutions and the business community. Also relevant is the role of a number of NGO's (Non-Governmental Organizations), created in developing countries during the 1990's, to provide information ranging from technical research to policy strategy papers. And since the mid-90's the Internet has accelerated the linkages of South NGO's with a number of Northern partners in both Europe and the U.S. These NGOs together act, in effect, as a "virtual secretariat" and often collaborate with a newly revitalized UNCTAD. Thus, a new proactive South has demanded some of the Uruguay Round rebalancing (termed "implementation") in the discussions in Geneva, but the Northern countries seem to be indisarray. The Transatlantic Alliance has weakened, strained by significant policy differences that go well beyond agriculture per se and involve social or cultural domestic concerns.